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The current research emerged in response to recent alerts of increasing organisational safety 
failures in New Zealand’s high risk industries. It was theorized that safety climate may be 
largely determined by the quality of safety-centered leadership under which an organisation 
operates. The study utilized reports of organisational safety prosecutions within New Zealand 
to develop a quasi-experimental design which compared persecuted and non-prosecuted 
company’s leaders on measures of ethical values, moral philosophy, social responsibility, 
corporate psychopathy, and leadership style. Issues of response rate inherent to the study 
design were encountered during data collection, and no significant between group differences 
consistent with the study predictions were found. Theoretical and practical interpretations are 
made in light of the results, suggesting that dynamics within group-decision processes and the 
top governing structure of companies may be significant factors in affecting leader safety 











The current research aimed to identify potential leadership-based antecedents of organistional 
safety outcomes in high-risk industries. Firstly, a summary of New Zealand’s current 
standings in its industrial health and safety status is provided. In particular, statistics on 
workplace injury and fatality rates are presented along with references to major national 
industrial safety incidents that have occurred over recent years. This then links to discussions 
highlighting the relevance of safety leadership to organistional safety awareness and 
compliance, with references to both contemporary field-expert perspectives and literature-
based empirical evidence of leader-attribute effects on organisational safety outcomes. Value 
and personality-based leader attributes are then examined in conjunction with the types of 
leadership styles that executive and directorial-level officials adopt in their performance of 
safety-related obligations. Finally, theories are posited suggesting that major organisational 
safety failures (in the form of legal prosecutions) may be the result of leader value-based 
attributes and leadership styles, with corresponding research hypotheses made to test for 
these arguments. 
 
Overview of Current State on New Zealand Health and Safety 
The current state of organizational health and safety in New Zealand in the last decade 
shows astonishing records of workplace related incidents involving deaths and injuries. 
Tallies of work related injury claims in New Zealand alone have reached as high as the 200, 
4 
 
000 mark in the early 2000’s. And although these figures have seen some gradual decrease 
over the years, the total recordable injury frequency rate (TRIFR) as reported by industries 
remains at a level of major concern (Statistics NZ, 2014). As a country largely based on 
heavy trades such as agriculture, forestry, fishery and manufacturing, New Zealand has 
undoubtedly seen its fair share of safety related incidents. Inside high-risk industries where 
workers are required to operate in and out of highly perilous environments involving heavy 
machinery, hazardous substances, and dangerous heights and landscapes, the possibilities of 
an operational mishap is constantly within a meter-long fall’s reach. A slip of the feet or a 
split-second lapse in judgment may result in a mere scratch to something as disastrous as a 
life-ending injury. The implications of this can be wide-reaching. From the obvious physical 
and emotional grievances suffered by the victim and their families, workplace-related 
incidents may also inflict hefty economic and social damages to an organization’s people and 
its business, such as costly lawsuits and loss of company reputation and status (Biggs, Banks, 
Davey, & Freeman, 2013).  
As possible and severe as the outcomes of organizational health and safety failures may 
be however, the amount of attention and effort placed on minimizing these possibilities 
remain largely disproportionate to the occurrences of workplace safety incidents observed 
over the years. Poor safety performances in New Zealand industries has been repeatedly 
recognized and acknowledged by both the media and business leaders (Hughes, 2013a; 
Gaffaney, 2014; Ministry of Business, 2014a; Roxburgh, 2014). An examination of 
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Department of Labour 2012 statistics shows an average of 102 workplace-related deaths were 
recorded in every 12 month-period (2008-2010), followed by 378 serious non-fatal injuries, 
and an alarming financial toll of $3.5 billion in social and financial costs associated with 
dealing with workplace injury and diseases. Gradual illnesses contracted in the workplace 
have also contributed to an estimated 516 to 804 deaths, with 17,000 to 20,000 new cases 
developing each year. Furthermore, figures from Statistics New Zealand reveals that 182,900 
ACC claims made in 2013 had originated from work-related injuries, which is a notable 
increase from the 180,000 cases recorded in 2012. In an overall perspective, this implies an 
injury claim rate of 92 cases per 1000 full-time employees, suggesting an approximate 9% 
injury report per year in the workplace since 2011. WorkSafe New Zealand also reports over 
51 workplace deaths for the 2013 year, with fatality counts rising continuously since 2007 
(Ministry of Business, 2014b).  
One of the most disastrous case of workplace health and safety in New Zealand is the 
2010 Pike River Coal Mine tragedy. The incident, with the loss of 29 workers, sparked major 
accusations towards the safety malpractice of the mining company and its officers, and 
specifically the negligence of the chief executive in failing to implement necessary safety 
management practices in the mine’s facility and operation (Ministry of Business, 2011). In 
their report on the incident, the Royal Commission on the Pike River Coal Mine Tragedy 
(2012) made specific effort in highlighting the appalling safety record New Zealand currently 
holds in comparison to other countries. In more recent cases, multiple reports of safety 
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incidents have been issued to organisations such as the Lyttelton Port company in 
Christchurch. Within the 12 months since November 2013, at least three accidents involving 
two deaths and one serious injury have occurred at the port’s Lyttleton operation site. This is 
once again startling evidence that accidents are occurring too frequently, and has inevitably 
attracted the attention of health and safety officials in demanding immediate improvements to 
be made in the company’s focus on health and safety practices (Wood, 2014) 
In the wake of all the incidents noted above, it is evident that New Zealand is in dire 
need of a re-evaluation of its health and safety systems for high-risk industries. Consequently, 
the health and safety landscape in New Zealand has begun to witness gradual increased action 
in driving changes to improve the current state of high-risk industry safety as a response to 
these poor performance records. As seen in the 2012 status report issued by the Department 
of Labour, the New Zealand government has introduced proposals for the increase of 
preventative actions in reducing health and safety issues in New Zealand. These proposals 
include numerous strategic system reforms, such as increased governmental funding for 
health and safety activity; industry target setting to reduce incident rates; improvement plans 
for the measurement, monitoring, timeliness and quality of injury and fatality report data; and 
implementing preventative actions in key industries requiring specific attention (such as 
forestry and agriculture). Major legislative changes are also taking place, such as the 
introduction of bills to reform the Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992. In terms of 
increased action on the organisational end, the ZeroHarm Safety Leaders Forum (2014) 
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annual summary report also highlighted the need for improvements on safety awareness and 
participation amongst business owners. In this report, areas of improvement include growing 
leader awareness of health and safety issues, increasing participation in forums, safety 
projects such as the Contract Safety Initiative and Executive Safety Leadership Programs, 
and facilitating safety guidance to directors and chief executives in gaining shared learning 
on methods of keeping industry operations safe.  
However, despite these efforts, bleak evidences of poor health and safety performance 
continues to emerge. The current study bases its research focus around Eriksen’s (2013) 
report on the status of health and safety prosecutions in New Zealand industries. An alarming 
number of 21 NZ organisations have been charged with major safety incident offenses more 
than once in the past five year period, with some organisations named in the article receiving 
as many as six convictions during this time. It then becomes pertinent to ask the question- 
what is it within the management of these organisations that is evoking such high rates of 
safety breaches? An examination of the prosecuted parties provided by WorkSafe New 
Zealand records reveals that in many of the cases reported, particular onus was placed on the 
leaders of the convicted companies. The charges named under the Health and Safety in 
Employment Act were mainly under the provision of “failing to take all practicable steps to 
ensure employee safety”. Many of the incidents may be attributed to causes such as lack of 
employee training, inadequate supervision, using unsafe or malfunctioning equipment, and 
carrying out tasks in under-protected work environments. More queries then surface in 
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relation to the role of the organisational leader in these incidents: how did the company’s 
management allow these incidents to occur, why had obvious safety issues been overlooked, 
and was the leader even aware of the potential problems that lurked beneath the operations 
taking place?  
The idea that dysfunctional safety leadership may be the common factor in these 
reported incidents then becomes increasingly tangible. As the head of their business, industry 
leaders are responsible for setting key visions, formulating strategies for reaching objectives, 
and planning the execution of operations through various decision making and 
implementation processes (Duckers, Stegeman, Spreeuwenberg, Wagner, Sanders, & 
Groenewegen, 2009; Gupta, 2009). Amongst their extensive range of responsibilities, 
industry leaders are also tasked with making decisions regarding the safety design and 
practice of their business operation. But does their safety-related responsibilities end here? 
The discussions below further explores the association between corporate leadership and 
industry safety, as well as examining theories on the interaction of leadership attributes and 
their possible influence on organisational safety outcomes.  
 
Safety Leadership 
In examining the link between leadership and organisational safety, the expression ‘The 
buck stops at the top’ aptly summarizes the key dynamic between the two constructs. 
Adopted from the words of Harry S. Truman during his US presidential terms, the phrase 
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depicts corporate responsibility as the buck that is passed on from one person to another 
(Eduljee, 2008) In line with the argument of the current study that leaders have a key 
responsibility for employee safety, this echoes the central concept that organisational safety 
must be a top-down process starting with the executive/directorial level leaders heading an 
organisation (McFadden, Henagan, & Gowen III, 2009; Roxburgh, 2014; Wu et al., 2008). 
Currently, the baton of health and safety is too often passed down from the top tiers of 
companies as a responsibility for those in the lower management level to shoulder (Davidson, 
2013; Hughes, 2013b; Nielsen, Eid, Mearns, & Larsson, 2013). Boards and leaders are often 
found lacking in health and safety-specific knowledge in the fields they are operating, a 
shortcoming which leaders are either conscious of but lack the initiative to make up for 
(passive leadership), or one that the leader may be entirely unaware of until issues arise 
(Mullen, Kelloway, & Teed, 2011). Strong evidence of this can be found in the 
aforementioned Lyttelton and Pike River cases, both of which have had particular 
expectations turned towards the CEOs heading these organisations in assuming responsibility 
(and both having seemingly failed to) for ensuring workplace incident and risk prevention 
(Koubaridis, 2011; Palmer, 2014). This disregard of workplace related safety responsibility 
stems from a myriad of factors, many of which can be found originating from the attitudes 
and mind-sets of the leaders themselves in their commitment to workplace safety.  
The case study by Shell Companies Chairman Rob Jager (2013) illustrates the crucial 
role of the leadership mindset in fostering a successful safety cultures at work. In Jager’s 
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view, the safety leader mindset is characterized by adopting a state of healthy “chronic 
unease”. This entails leaders maintaining an active and constant state of vigilance over health 
and safety issues at work- by way of taking initiative in understanding safety risks at the 
frontline level, having personal involvement in clarifying and monitoring safety performance, 
and lastly holding every company member to account on safety matters. In their discussion 
“Safety leadership must start at the top” in the National Business Review, Holcim director 
Smith (2012) also stresses the same fact. Active safety leadership starting from the top tiers of 
the organisation is imperative and leaders must be a major driving force in establishing safety 
cultures at work. Smith pushes for a “zero harm safety first” mentality, one that prompts 
leaders to proactively assess and prioritize the importance of worker wellbeing and workplace 
safety against other organisational obligations. This then should be translated into meaningful 
steps and actions to reach the zero-harm objective, such as actively taking part in health and 
safety decision making, as well as engaging workers at the front line on safety knowledge and 
practice.  
Academic advocates of safety leadership too are encouraging specific focus on leader 
participation and engagement in workplace health and safety issues. This involves the leader 
demonstrating pro-active safety orientated attitudes and behaviours with employees across all 
levels in the organisation. Kelloway’s (2014) SAFER model illustrates this with five key 
action concepts: Speak, Act, Focus, Engage, and Recognize. In directing a high risk industry, 
leaders are firstly expected to be vocally active about safety issues (Speak). This involves not 
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only communicating about the importance of safety awareness and compliance themselves, 
but also encouraging further discussions across the top executive body and continuing down 
the management and frontline operation teams (Duckers et al., 2009). Facilitating board 
meetings where health and safety is included as a main agenda, and conversing with 
supervisors and workers about potential risks down at the production line are practical 
examples of how leaders can verbally maintain safety consciousness at work. Next, 
discussions made on safety matters need to manifest into tangible action (Act). Leaders are 
required to listen and respond to issues presented to them during communications with 
actions to address those problems. The sustaining of attention and effort in upholding safety 
awareness compliance is then necessary for successful outcomes to emerge (focus), which 
includes maintaining close interactions with employees (Engage), and continued 
identification of safety-related behaviours and feedback reporting (Recognize).  
Major reforms in the law are also making contributions in prompting leaders to better 
their performance in carrying out the due diligences listed above. As a response to the Royal 
Commission’s attempts at solidifying the CEO’s liability in the Pike River incident, 
upcoming changes in New Zealand’s health and safety legislation are also being made 
explicitly as a warning sign that industry leaders in particular are now being held accountable 
for all safety related incidents in their business. This bill to reform New Zealand’s health and 
safety systems serves to highlight the increased need for leaders to take conscious 
responsibility for health and safety matters in their industries. As of April 2015, new 
12 
 
provisions under the Health and Safety at Work Act (formerly Health and Safety in 
Employment Act 1992) will be put in place to enforce diligence obligations on “officers” 
(business directors, CEOS, any person of decision making authority over a business) in 
ensuring compliance with health and safety obligations, as well as naming the primary duty 
holders and their responsibilities at work (Wilson, 2014). Under this new legislation, it is no 
longer acceptable for industry leaders to remain unaware of the current state of health and 
safety in their organisation. Leaders can no longer deny responsibility for incidents on the 
basis of having a lack of familiarity or knowledge about the safety affairs, and are now 
expected to take active initiative in familiarizing themselves with all potential risks and 
hazards in the workplace, as well as the appropriate practical steps in controlling for these 
risks (Wu, Chen, & Li, 2008).  
The set of actions above with which a leader demonstrates safety commitment in 
promoting health and safety behaviour and practices is then transferred onto their employees, 
who from there are prompted to adopt similar values and attitudes in their own work safety 
performances (Mullen, 2014; Oumlil & Balloun, 2009). Past findings also supports this 
leader-follower dynamic, whereby the senior level supervisors tend to exhibit strong 
influence over the safety attitude of employees alongside other safety related outcomes 
(Dingsdag, Biggs, & Sheahan 2008) 
The exact person-related factors that facilitate leader influence on follower safety 
perceptions and attitudes however remain somewhat nebulous. Conchie, Moon and Duncan 
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(2013) found that contextual influences such as role overload, business demands, and 
characteristics of their specific workforces affected supervisory engagement with safety 
leadership behaviour. However, a deeper analysis of what person and values-level attributes 
are involved in interaction with these situational factors remains scarce. Fruhen, Mearns, Flin 
and Kirwan (2013) takes a further step in this investigation of leadership characteristics, and 
finds six person-based attributes that significantly influence the safety intelligence in senior 
leaders: social competency, safety knowledge, motivation, problem solving, personality and 
interpersonal leadership skills. But it is yet unclear how each of these attributes may affect a 
leader’s ability and intention to engage in health and safety practices. While Fruhen and 
colleagues’ findings centre mostly on competency and skill-based leadership traits, the 
current study speculates that value and intention-driven traits may also play a significant role 
in influencing safety leadership perception and outcomes. It has been suggested that the type 
of intentions and behaviour upper-level managers and leaders exhibit in work settings is 
largely shaped by their natural dispositional traits and individual self-concepts (Huhtala, 
Kangas, Lamasa, & Feldt, 2013). With this notion in mind, it is argued that intention to 
engage in safety related conduct may also be influenced by these personal values and beliefs, 
such as ethical and moral values and ideologies. This study thus aimed to examine these 
possibilities.  
Outside of the safety context, Oumlil and Balloun (2009) have also concluded that 
business leaders’ decisions involving fairness and justice (which often encompasses health 
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and safety) are largely governed by attributes such as ethical and social concerns. In 
accordance with the saying ‘with great power comes great responsibility’, there is a common 
expectation for leaders to follow the principles of justice, equity and fairness in their right to 
exercise the powers of decision making and authority (Ciulla, 1998). Following this assertion, 
Huhtala et al. (2013) posits that a value-based ethical dimension will always be an implicit or 
explicit part of leadership practice and processes. Current literature has reported that 
employee perceptions towards safety policies, organisational commitment, and performance 
quality are positive top-down outcomes of ethical leadership (Ambrose 2008; Hansen, Alge, 
Brown, Jackson, Dunford, 2013; Hunt, Wood, & Chonko, 1989).  
 
Ethical, Moral, Social, and Psychological Facets of Safety Leadership 
Like many of the safety leadership behaviours discussed earlier, climate-defining 
attributes such as organisational ethics is also demonstrated as an influential top-down 
process (Webley & Werner, 2008). Top-level management and leaders are required to 
showcase ethical commitment in all of their organisational practices in order to instil the 
same mindset in their employees. Leaders are responsible for guiding workers through ethical 
issues and demonstrating the right and wrongs of various work related situations, and 
ultimately acts as the moral compass from which employees directs their own ethical and 
moral perceptions (Mayer, Aquino, Greenbaum, & Kuenzi, 2012; Resick, Hargis, Shao, & 
Dust, 2013; Vlachos, 2013). It then becomes relevant to consider the exact value-based 
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attributes that might come into play in a leader’s safety related decision making. Leaders are 
frequently required to juggle attending to health and safety matters against obvious business 
constraints such as time and cost, a balance on which safety is often placed on the lighter end 
of the scale (Hansen et al., 2013; Nicholson, 2014). The leader’s ethical standards and moral 
reasoning then act as major factors in affecting how they determine the rights and wrongs of 
safety-related decisions (Ambrose, 2008). A profit-orientated CEO would be likely to 
consider the costs of installing updated safety systems in their organisation with what could 
be made without such efforts. Their final decision may then largely depend on if the leader’s 
ethical and moral perceptions deems the lack of investment on safety measures as something 
that is wrong and potentially harmful to their employees. Joosten, Dijke, Hiel and Cremer 
(2014) also identifies that possessing good moral identity serves as a motivational basis to 
engaging in ethical behaviour. A CEO with a stronger moral perception may then be more 
inclined to place health and safety as a higher agenda item amongst the organisation’s other 
obligations. Decisions to take part in safety behaviour may also depend on the level of 
corporate social responsibility the leader holds towards the organisation and its workers. In 
socially responsible leaders, particular focus is placed on fostering the welfare of the 
organisation’s own people (employees, customers, stakeholders), as well as to the larger 
community it is surrounded by (Perez & Rodriquez del Bosque, 2013). This results in 
outcomes such as employee benefits, workplace support, and enhanced business practices 
including health and safety (Du, Swaen, Lindgreen, & Sen, 2013). 
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The absence of ethical, moral and social considerations in leaders may also signpost 
potential deviating leadership personalities. In investigation of this leader dynamic, the 
concept of corporate psychopathy is also considered. This depicts organisational members 
(leaders in many cases) who engage in anti-social workplace behaviours such as exploitation, 
abusing positional powers, violating employee trust, and taking part in acts of fraud and 
dishonest business practices for financial or personal gains (Babiak, 1995; Babiak, Neumann, 
& Hare, 2010). The findings by Babiak and colleagues have suggested alarming evidence of 
psychopathic leadership in the normal community, whose levels of latent psychopathic 
tendencies were found to be on similar levels with those in criminal populations. This 
prompts further research interest in the current study in speculating possible associations 
between leadership psychopathy and organisational safety outcomes. In Westerlaken and 
Wood’s (2013) study, psychopathy was found to correlate positively with a passive leadership 
styles that entails avoidance of decision making and organisational responsibility. This 
neglect of leadership obligations may very likely expand to negatively affect the presence and 
quality of safety implementations within organisations, as well as the policies and rules of 
compliance that surround safety measures.  
 
Leadership Styles on Safety Outcome 
Westerlaken and Wood’s (2013) results also highlights the influence of leadership styles 
on corporate outcomes. Continuing on this trend, the meta-analysis by Clarke (2013) further 
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suggests significant association of leadership styles with safety activity and behaviour in 
organisations. It was identified in this study that transformational and transactional leadership 
each exerts positive impacts on safety outcomes such as rule compliance, employee safety 
participation, and overall perceived safety climate. In Clarke’s review, transformational 
leadership influences safety outcomes through the leader’s ability to foster heightened 
employee attitude and commitment towards safety issues at work. Under this approach 
leaders establish positive influences over employees through acts of consideration and 
inspiration, which in turn garners employee trust and identification with the leader’s 
organisational values and vision. Translated into a safety context, followers become 
motivated to engage in safety practices themselves as they actively share the leader’s goals in 
achieving positive safety climates at work. Transactional leadership on the other hand is 
largely associated with the use of contingent rewards and active management of employees in 
correcting for worker behaviour before possible problems could arise. Through contingent 
reward leaders and followers share a reciprocal-exchange relationship, where behaviours in 
meeting work expectations and objectives are acknowledged with extrinsic or intrinsic 
rewards such as monetary bonuses and company recognition (Howell & Avolio, 1993). 
Applying this to organisational safety, transactional leaders may reward their managers and 
frontline workers for their adherence to safety procedures and policies such as wearing 
protective gear around hazardous work environments, which has shown to increase employee 
reliability in workplace safety performance (Zohar, 2002). On the other end of this spectrum 
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then lies the negative construct of passive-avoidant leadership. Defined by Avolio and Bass 
(1995) as laissez-faire and passive management by exception (MBEP) styles, passive-
avoidant leadership characterizes leaders as being absent and aversive of organisational 
obligations and duties. Leaders operating under this style are non-responsive to employee 
needs, fails to address workplace issues until problems arise, and displays ambivalent or 
ignorant attitudes towards matters requiring critical decisive action (Jackson, Hutchinson, 
Peters, Luck, & Saltman, 2013). It is then largely foreseeable that such a style is likely to 
inflict negative impact on risk-prone areas such as workplace safety, as readily demonstrated 
by Kelloway, Mullen, & Francis’(2006) study on the effects of opposing leadership styles in 
organisational safety. Incremental influences on passive-avoidant leadership were found to 
negatively affect workplace safety consciousness and climate, which has inevitably lead to 
increased injury rates on work sites. Transformational leadership on the other hand was found 
to exhibit the exact opposite effect to passive-avoidant leadership on safety outcomes, which 
then once again reinforces the assumption that leadership styles are significant indicators in 
determining the types of safety outcomes an organisation is likely to anticipate.  
Similarly, field studies by Hystad, Bartone, and Eid (2014) also demonstrates 
transformational and authentic leadership styles as being predictors and enhancers of safety 
climate and performance. Their examination of authentic safety leadership identifies this 
effect as the result of “a pattern of leader behaviors that draws upon and promotes both 
positive psychological capacities and a positive ethical climate to foster self-awareness, an 
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internalized moral perspective, balanced processing of information…and influence over 
subordinates [through] positive role modeling” (p.43). This description aptly echoes the 
value, personality, and leadership-style based attributes which the current study argues has 
significant relevance to organisational safety outcomes. Internal ethical climate and moral 
perspectives signal the ethical, moral, and social responsibilities leaders should possess and 
demonstrate in their performance of organisational duties. Psychopathic characteristics in 
corporate leadership is then associated as a potential flipside to positive psychological 
capacities. Lastly, positive role modelling alludes to the influential components of 
transformational leadership, all of which may be pertinent constructs in establishing specific 
leader attitudes and behaviours in the workplace. As presented below, discrepancies in the 
level of these character-shaping factors may affect leader performances in the organisational 
safety context with notable contrasting implications. 
 
Current Research 
In relation to the discussion of leader attributes above, it is postulated that ethical, moral, 
social and psychological attributes could influence the type of safety leadership style each 
individual possesses. Moreover, the combination of these traits and styles may then give rise 
to differing organisational safety outcomes, such as an increased number of accidents and 
levels of injury or fatality rates. In particular, the value and personality-shaping constructs 
within those assuming leadership roles will be considered in the light of the incident prone 
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industries mentioned above. The present study thus aims to build on the safety leadership 
literature by attempting to identify differences in safety perceptions between executive-level 
leaders in organisations with and without reported safety incidents. To achieve this, 
organisations with safety related prosecution histories in New Zealand will be compared with 
their corresponding non-prosecuted industry counterparts to determine if there are differences 
in leadership attributes. This comparative design of the study was aimed to reveal insights 
into leadership attributes and styles existing within current organisational leaders, which 
paired with their industry safety records (prosecutions or no prosecutions), may be very 
telling of the level and quality of safety leadership in high-risk industries. 
Presently, the majority of research conducted on corporate health and safety focuses 
heavily on measuring employee perceptions of leader influences on safety outcomes, (Kapp, 
2012; Zohar, Huang, Lee, & Robertson, 2014; Wu et al., 2008), whilst little attempts are 
found in addressing the top-tier leader’s own perception and attitudes in the workplace 
(Hansen et al., 2013; Schminke, Ambrose, & Neubaum, 2005). Employee perceptions 
however, while telling of their immediate supervisor or manager’s approaches towards safety 
compliance, often do not accurately reflect the true safety values of the top organisational 
directors and CEO’s with whom they have limited interactions (Brown, Trevino, & Harrison, 
2005). This consequently prompted the current study to focus its investigation on 
organisational leaders in the top executive and directorial positions in order to capture true 
safety leadership qualities more closely at the first-person level.  
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The rationale for the current research is then formulated, whereby the degree to which 
leaders possesses ethical, moral, and social regards towards the wellbeing of both employees 
and the organisation itself will be reflected in the form of safety prosecutions. Positive 
leadership styles (transformational and transactional) may be found in leaders whose 
organisations have not been reported for major safety-related incidents. Vice versa, the study 
expects to find comparatively lower levels of value-based attributes, higher psychopathic 
personality characteristics, and/or more prominent passive-avoidant leadership being 
demonstrated in organisations that have been charged with safety offenses in the past. The 
argument posits that through value-guided decision making processes, behavioural actions 
such as safety compliance and rule implementation may manifest, in turn increasing 
employee and worker awareness, and enforcing practices to increase overall organizational 
safety climate. Specifically, the constructs of corporate ethical values (CEV), personal moral 
philosophy (MP), corporate social responsibility (CSR) and psychopathic personality traits 
will be assessed through leader self-report ratings. A measure for identifying leadership styles 
will also be administered to compliment the results found on the four attributes above. Using 
Clarke’s (2013) review on leadership styles, a further extension to the research hypothesis is 
added, suggesting that leaders from prosecuted and non-prosecuted organisations can also be 
operating under different leadership styles due to their differing levels of value and 
personality-based attributes mentioned above. This subsequently generates three key 




H1: Leaders in organisations with no prosecution records will exhibit higher levels of a.) 
ethical values, b.) moral philosophy, c.) corporate social responsibility, and lower levels of 
d.) psychopathic personality traits when compared to leaders in organisations with 
prosecution records 
 
H2: Leaders in non-prosecuted organisations will demonstrate higher levels of 
transformational or/and transactional leadership styles than leaders from organisationals with 
prosecution records. 
 
H3: Leaders in organizations with prosecution records will demonstrate higher levels of 




















The current research adopted a quasi-experimental design using company prosecution 
status for categorizing the independent variable of prosecuted and non-prosecuted 
organisations. Companies holding records of safety-related prosecutions within the 2012 to 
2014 period were allocated into the prosecution group, while those without reports of safety 
prosecutions in the same time span were placed in the non-prosecuted group. To identify 
which group a returned response belong to, the prosecuted and non-prosecuted organisations 
were sent and identified by different colour-coded survey booklets. 
 
Sampling 
Hardcopy surveys were distributed to a total of 100 directors and chief executive officers 
of high-risk industries within New Zealand. A list of 50 high risk organisations owned and 
operating within New Zealand with histories of reported safety prosecution dating back to 
2012 were solicited through various media and technological channels. Informational sources 
such as news articles (NZ Herald, Stuff.co.nz), public legal databases (UC Law Subject 
Guide), and websites of governmental bodies such as the Ministry of Business, Innovation 
and Employment were consulted for records of safety-related prosecutions in New Zealand 
industries. The names of the organisation and corresponding CEO’s were then compiled. 
Similarly, a list of 50 non-prosecuted companies were found via consulting organisational 
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listing websites such as IndexNZ, business.govt.nz, and OpenCorporates. The organisations 
in each group came from the same industries, which includes forestry, construction, 
manufacturing, transport and logistics, farming, engineering, aviation, metal works, 
recreation, and domestic services. Sampled companies included a mixture of both private and 
public sector industries. All organisations were sent paper and pencil surveys via posted mail 
personally addressed to the leader of that company (where the names of the leader was not 
available, a general “CEO/Director” title was used).  
 
Participants 
A total of eighteen organisational leaders responded to the research survey. All 
participants were directorial or chief executive-level job incumbents within their organisation. 
Position titles varied with the structures of the company that each participant headed, 
including chief executive officer, director, managerial director, general manager, and 
executive general manager. Overall, 16 males and 2 females took part in the study, with an 
overall mean age of 49.6 years (SD= 8.5) for the entire participant sample. The average 
length of tenure in the participant’s current job position was 126.4 months (10.5 years), with a 
minimum tenure of 3 months and maximum of 432 months (36 years). The mean company 
size consisted of 198 employees, ranging from a minimum of 4 to a maximum of 1000 





The survey instrument was constructed using a compilation of adapted scales measuring 
the constructs of ethical values, moral philosophy, corporate social responsibility, 
psychopathy, and leadership style. Participating organisational leaders were asked to rate 
items on each of the four constructs based on their perceptions of themselves. For two of the 
leadership constructs (ethical values and corporate social responsibility), the wording in each 
of the scales were adapted from rater-leader perspectives to first person perceptions eg. From 
“ [The leader] Has the best interests of employees in mind” to “I have the best interests of my 
employees in mind”. Titled “New Zealand Industrial Leadership Research Survey”, the 
survey comprises of seven main sections. The first section was headed by a demographic 
information page (See Appendix A for survey booklet), which requests for general participant 
information age, gender, job tenure, size of company, and industry type. An organisational 
activity time allocation form was then constructed and added as part of the demographics 
section to obtain information on the time percentages leaders spend on various organisation 
tasks. These include: risk management, resource acquisition, logistics, budget activities, 
performance/efficiency issues, pricing/sales, contract negotiation, compliance with 
legislation, legal matters, such as prosecutions, selection of staff and other human resource 
issues, and other.  
A 5-item strategy development style question item was included for leaders to indicate 
their dominant decision-making styles specifically towards health and safety issues. For this 
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question, Judge and Dobbin’s (1995) adaptation of Vroom and Yetton’s (1973) model on 
decision methods for group and individual problems was adopted for the current survey. 
Judge and Dobbin’s version of the scale was used in this case rather than the original due to 
its more simplified and relevant wording for the purposes of the present study. (See Appendix 
A for question and response selections) 
The study used a 1 to 7 point likert rating scale for four of the five scales (Ethical values, 
moral philosophy, corporate social responsibility, and psychopathy), with response anchors 
ranging from (1) strongly disagree, to (2) disagree, (3) somewhat disagree, (4) neutral, (5) 
somewhat agree, (6) agree, to (7) strongly agree. The exception from this response format 
was for the leadership style Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire (MLQ) measure, which 
used a 5 point frequency scale: 0 (Not at all) to 4 (frequently, if not always). The average 
scores of all scales were derived by summing the ratings for each item and dividing by the 
total number of items in the scale. To counterbalance the influence of common method 
variance and order effects, three versions of the survey was distributed with each of the scales 
placed in different orders in the survey booklet. With the exception of Judge and Dobbin’s 
(1995) decision-making scale, the relevance of health and safety was not mentioned for any 
of the other scales in order to minimize multicollinearity of responses as well as the creation 





Ethical Leadership Scale 
Ethical values was assessed by an adapted version of the Ethical Leadership Scale (ELS) 
by Brown, Trevino and Harrison (2005). This instrument consists of ten items, which 
captures the ethical leadership construct through the rater’s perceptions of their own leaders 
in the workplace. Example items include: “I make fair and balanced decisions”, “I set an 
example of how to do things the right way in terms of ethics”. High scores suggested high 
perceived levels of ethical conduct exhibited by the leader. The items of the scale were 
designed by Brown et al. (2005) to reflect values that demonstrated ethical leadership 
behaviour, including consideration, honesty, trust, fairness in interaction, and social charisma. 
The initial development of the ELS yielded a reliable internal consistency coefficient of .92, 
and was subsequently confirmed with test-retest alpha values of .94 and .93 by the same 
research group. (See Appendix A section 1 for full scale) 
 
Ethics Position Questionnaire 
Moral philosophy was measured by the Ethics Position Questionnaire (EPQ) by Forsyth 
(1980), which assesses the leader’s degree of idealism and relativism to universal moral and 
ethical rules and standards. The scale comprises two parts: idealism and relativism, each 
measured by ten items. Idealism is described by Forsyth as being the extent to which a rater 
agrees that desired consequences, such as the concern for the welfare of others, can always be 
achieved with the right, or, ideal actions. Example items include: “One should not perform an 
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action which might in any way threaten the dignity and welfare of another individual”. 
Relativism then assesses the rater’s moral standings with rules and standards in relation to the 
contexts they are surrounded by, mainly cultural, social, individual and historical. Examples 
include: Relativism- “Moral standards should be seen as being individualistic; what one 
person considers to be moral may be judged to be immoral by another person”. For the 
purposes of the current research, only the idealism items were included in the research survey 
due to their relevance to safety related leader judgements. High scores on the idealism scale 
suggest that the individual possesses strong ideals in achieving desired outcomes through 
morally just and right actions. The EPQ has generated reliable internal consistency 
coefficients for both parts of the scale, with .80 and .73 for idealism and relativism 
respectively. Test-retest consistency values of .82 and .84 were later confirmed in subsequent 
studies by Forsyth, Nye and Kelley (1987). (See Appendix A section 2 for full scale) 
 
Corporate Social Responsibility Image Scale 
The corporate social responsibility image scale (CSRI) developed by Perez and 
Rodriquez del Bosque (2013) was adopted to measure an organisation’s degree of concern 
and consideration exhibited towards social, cultural, and environmental affairs. The original 
20 items are rated by respondents based on their perceptions towards the company, and the 
wording was adapted for the current study to prompt self-ratings from participating leaders. 
Only 5 out of the 20 items (items 10 to 14) from the CSRI were included in the current 
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survey given their relevance to employee safety and wellbeing within organisations. 
Examples include: “I offer training and career opportunities to my employees”, “I contribute 
money to cultural and social events (eg. music, sports)”. High ratings on the scale indicates 
respondents possess significant levels of corporate responsibility towards facilitating the 
welfare of their employees, specifically in regards to remuneration, safety, fair treatment, 
training and career opportunities, and positive work environment. Perez and Rodriquez del 
Bosque reported sound sectional reliability coefficient ranges for each of the four item groups 
(Customers .81 - .86, shareholders & supervising boards .76 - .80, employees .86 - .89, 
society .87 - .89). (See Appendix A section 3 for full scale) 
 
Levenson Psychopathy Self-Report Scale 
The Levenson Psychopathy Self Report Scale (LPSR) developed by Levenson, Kiehl, 
and Fitzpatrick (1995) was used to measure the psychopathic dimension of an individual’s 
social and interpersonal philosophies. The scale is divided into two parts, with 16 items 
pertaining to primary psychopathy (eg. “Looking out for myself is my top priority”), and 10 
items to secondary psychopathy (eg. “I quickly lose interest in tasks I start”). Items on the 
primary psychopathy section are geared towards measuring antisocial and manipulative 
behaviour, with high ratings on this scale indicating significant tendencies to demonstrate 
selfish and inconsiderate behaviours towards others for one’s own gains. Part two of the scale 
focuses on capturing social impulsivity and self-defeating lifestyles. A reliability coefficient 
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of .82 was achieved for primary psychopathy, while the secondary items obtained an alpha 
of .63. Later re-examinations by Gummelt, Anestis, and Carbonell (2012) of the LPSR 
reported satisfactory test- retest levels of .65 (with items omitted). The 10 secondary 
psychopathy items were not used in the current survey due the consideration that the items 
were not relevant to either corporate or organisational safety contexts. Some item wordings 
were changed in the primary psychopathy scale from colloquial to more formal terms 
appropriate for a CEO population (eg., “My main purpose in life is getting as many goodies 
as I can” was changed to “My main purpose in life is getting as many benefits as I can”). (See 
Appendix A section 4 for full scale) 
 
Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire 
The Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire (MLQ) developed by Avolio and Bass (1995) 
was used to assess transformational, transactional, and passive/avoidant leadership styles. 
The MLQ 5X-Short Leader self-rating form was used to measure transformational, 
transactional, and passive-avoidant leadership styles in the present study. Transformational 
leadership entails active leader commitment and engagement in fostering employee 
development and welfare via inspirational and motivational approaches, while transactional 
leadership involves prompting employee performance through contingent rewards and 
exchange systems. Passive-avoidant leadership represents the negative counterpart of the two 
styles above, entailing passive, dysfunctional leadership adopted by responsibility-averse 
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leaders who are negligent of organisational duties and absent to follower needs. The scale 
comprises of 45 items measuring 9 leadership subfactors: idealised attributes, idealised 
behaviours or influence, inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation, individual 
consideration, contingent reward, active management by exception (MBEA), passive 
management by exception (MBEP), and laissez-faire. The scale also includes 9 items 
pertaining to the result of leadership characteristics, comprising of outcome factors of extra 
effort in leadership, leader effectiveness, and satisfaction. Participants rated items based on 
the frequency of their efforts in engaging in these styles of leadership behaviour. High 
averaged ratings of leadership subfactor items on the response frequency scale indicate the 
tendencies of the respondent in demonstrating one leadership style more than the norm they 
are compared against. For example, leaders who achieved the highest average score on 
transformational leadership items are characterizes as more having more transformational 
qualities. Initial analysis by Avolio and Bass yielded sound reliability alphas for all six 
factors, with charisma (.92), intellectual stimulation (.83), individualized consideration (.79), 
contingent reward (.80), passive avoidance (.84), and active management by exception (.63). 
This was followed up by a second replication test, which produced similar internal 
consistency values to the original sample set (.92, .78, .78, .74, .86, and .64 respectively). 







The administrative procedure of the study involved three main stages- sample 
generation, instrument design, and survey distribution. In compiling the research survey 
package, survey booklets were attached with an information sheet (see Appendix B) 
addressed to the leader of each company. This contained an invitation for participants to take 
part in the study, as well as to brief them on the general nature of the study. Information 
regarding assurance of anonymity, the University’s human ethics committee approval for the 
study, and details for contacting the researcher were also provided. Lastly, the survey package 
contained a postage-paid return envelope to allow submission of participant responses back to 
the researcher.  
The completed survey package was then posted to the head offices of the 100 companies 
chosen by the researcher. Returned surveys were collected over a one month period. Follow-
up reminder letters were then dispatched to the same organisations after approximately one 
month and ten days to encourage responses. An electronic version of the survey was also 
generated using the Qualtrics Online Survey Software Platform website, with the address link 
included in the reminder letter to allow participants who may no longer have access to the 
hardcopy version of survey to participate (See Appendix C for letter sample). Returned 
response data was manually entered into the IBM SPSS statistics program. The methods of 
analyses used included descriptive statistics for generating demographic information such as 
average age and job tenure, and independent samples t-tests were used to compare average 
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A total of 18 cases were returned from the 100 companies sampled. The response rate 
for the non-prosecuted sample group was 8%, and 10% for the prosecuted sample. This 
response rate is clearly less than desirable, however an analysis of the results was still 
undertaken. Issues associated with collecting data from company leaders are addressed in the 
general discussion section.  
The demographic statistics for age, job tenure and company size are presented in Table 
1. The mean age for both prosecuted and non-prosecuted groups sits fairly high at around 49 
years, as commonly observed for organisational leaders working at the senior 
executive/directorial level. In job tenure, leaders from the prosecuted organisations shows 
relatively longer occupancy in their current positions than those in the non-prosecuted group. 
In terms of company size, the prosecuted organisations reported having a larger averages in 
the number of employees working for the company. The non-prosecuted group consisted of 8 
males and no females, including 2 CEO’s, 3 directors, 1 Managing Director and 1 
Commercial Manager, and 37.5% of responses were issued from the construction and 
building industry, 25% from manufacturing and production, and 12.5% each from 
transportation and logistics, forestry, and agriculture. The prosecuted group comprised of 8 
males and 2 females, including 3 CEO’s, 2 Managing Directors, 1 Director, 1 Executive 
Director, 1 General Manager, 1 General Affairs Manager, and 1 Foreman. For the prosecuted 
group, 30% were from the construction and building industry, 20% from manufacturing and 
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production, and 10% from recreation, agriculture, forestry, recycling and waste disposal, and 
others.  
 










Age  49.86 (6.79) 49.5 (9.91) 
Job Tenure in Months 100.89 (89.64) 149 (148.14) 





   
   
Mean percentages of time allocation to organisational activities are presented in Table 2. 
Upon inspection it can be seen that leaders from non-prosecuted organisations spends 
relatively higher percentages of time on performance-related activities such as resource 
acquisition, logistics, budget activities, performance and efficiency issues, and contract 
negotiation. In safety-related activities, the non-prosecuted group also reports more time 
spent on compliance with legislation, legal matters, as well as other responsibilities. 
Conversely the leaders from prosecuted companies appears to allocate more time to pricing 
and sales-related performance agendas, as well as risk management, staff selection, and other 
human resources related issues. Overall, leaders from non-prosecuted organisational have 
shown relatively larger involvement in dealing with performance-related agendas with more 
time percentage reported for these activities, while the two groups appear equal in their 
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involvement with safety-related agendas.  
 
Table 2. Mean Time Percentage of Organisational 
Activities By Groups 











Safety Related Activities:   
Risk Management 11.25 12.29 
Compliance with Legislation 9.29 8.13 
Legal matters eg. Prosecutions 5 4 
Selection of staff, and other Human Resource issues 8.67 15 
Performance Related Activities:   
Resource Acquisition 15.71 7 
Logistics 14.17 12.17 
Budget Activities 11.88 11.43 
Performance / Efficiency Issues 13.75 13.57 
Pricing / Sales 12.57 22.14 
Contract Negotiation 10 8.14 
Other 10 5 
 
Table 3 reports the percentage of safety-related decision making styles adopted by 
leaders in each group. In the non-prosecuted group, 50% of leaders adopted a group 
consensus-based decision making strategy: 25% indicated that they made decisions alone 
after consulting relevant persons separately, and 25% opted to make decisions alone after 
consulting relevant persons together as a group. For the prosecuted group, all 10 leaders 
(100%) identified the group consensus-based strategy as their main decision making style. 
This suggests that rather than being the sole authority on decision-making, leaders in 
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prosecuted organisations are largely inclined to formulate safety-related strategies after 
unifying opinions and reaching agreement with others as a group, whereas more leaders in 
non-prosecuted organisations are found to adopt more individual-based decision-making 
styles after obtaining the information they require from others to inform these decisions.  
 
Table 3. Percentage of Leaders’ Safety Decision Making 
Style Choices By Groups  
    
Please review the following 5 strategy development styles. 
Thinking specifically about workplace health and safety, 
select the statement that best describes your decision style 
when making the most important strategic health and safety 






I make decisions myself using the information available to 
me at the present time  
  
I obtain any necessary information from  
others, and then make the strategic decision myself 
  
I share the strategic problem with relevant persons without 
bringing them together as a group. Then I make the strategic 
decisions myself. 
25  
I share the strategic problem with others in a group meeting. 
In this meeting, I obtain their ideas and suggestions. Then I 
make the strategic decision 
25  
I share the problem with others as a group. Together we 
generate and evaluate strategic alternatives and attempt to 
reach agreement (consensus) on a strategic decision. 
50 100 
 
The demographic results thus far have not shown any notable outcomes distinguishing 
the prosecuted and non-prosecuted organisations. To test for potential influences that factors 
such as job tenure and company size may have on subsequent analyses, means for these 
variables were compared via t-tests for possible between group differences. Neither job 
38 
 
tenure nor company size was found to differ significantly between the two groups (p= .44 
and .76 respectively). The organisational activity time allocation table also shows both 
organisational groups being approximately equal in their time spent on safety-related 
activities. One interesting point to note is the variation of decision-making styles that leaders 
from the two study groups have indicated. Non-prosecuted leaders are shown to be more 
inclined to make decisions individually while prosecuted organisational leaders tend to base 
decisions on the outcomes of group consensus. This result will be examined further in the 
discussions to follow. 
 
Scale Reliability Analysis 
Prior to conducting comparative analyses to test the hypotheses, the response data was 
checked for missing values, and the reliability statistics of each scale were examined 
thereafter. The data set consisted of one case in the prosecution sample with 5 missing values 
which were replaced with the item means for that group. Scale means, standard deviations 
and cronbach alphas are presented in Table 4. Upon inspection it is indicated that the ethical 
leadership scale (ELS), ethics position questionnaire (EPQ), corporate social responsibility 
scale (CSR) and psychopathy self-report scales (PSY) all produced satisfactory reliability 
coefficients. Reliability analysis of all scales was conducted using all cases (N=18), and no 
indication of alpha improvement with item deletion was found for any of the four attribute-
based scales used (ELS, EPQ, CSR, and PSY). The Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire 
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(MLQ) on the other hand yielded more varying results, with two leadership style scales 
(Transactional and Passive Avoidant) showing significantly lower alpha values upon first 
analysis. Item removal was conducted to produce improved reliability alphas for these two 
subscales, with transactional leadership and passive avoidant leadership at .66 and .76 
respectively. After confirming scale reliability, scores for each of the scales were calculated 
by summing the ratings to each item and dividing the sum by the final number of items in 
each scale. The minimum to maximum average score range achieved in the present study for 
each scale are as follows: Ethical Leadership Scale (5.6 - 7), Ethics Position Questionnaire 
(3.3 - 7), Corporate Social Responsibility Scale (5 - 7), Psychopathy Self-Report Scale (1.13 
– 3.75), Transformational Leadership (2.4 – 3.55), Transactional Leadership (1.5 – 3.19), and 
Passive-Avoidant Leadership (.14 – 2.43). It is notable a ceiling effect can be found for 
several scales (Ethics, moral, and social reliability scales), with maximum scores of 7 
indicating that respondents tend to rate themselves rather highly on these attributes. Similarly, 
extreme low average scores were found for the psychopathy self-report scale and passive-
avoidant leadership scales, also suggesting that leaders may be inclined to present themselves 







Table 4. Mean, SD, and Reliability Coefficients of 
Attribute and Leadership Style Scales  







Ethical Leadership Scale .84 NC 6.23 .43 
Ethics Position Questionnaire  .88 NC 5.77 .95 
Corporate Social Responsibility  .72 NC 6.32 .56 
Psychopathy Self Report Scale  .80 NC 2.13 .69 
Multifactor Leadership Scales:     
Transformational Leadership .82 NC 3.13 .35 
Transactional Leadership .57 .66 2.41 .58 
Passive Avoidant Leadership .72 .76 1.02 .59 
NC= No Change     
 
Between Group Comparison 
Several independent samples T-test were then conducted to test hypotheses 1, 2 and 3. 
The analyses compared the measures of ethical values, moral philosophy, corporate 
responsibility, psychopathy, and leadership styles between the prosecuted and non-prosecuted 
organisations. The assumptions of homogeneity of variance were not violated, with all scales 
achieving non-significance on the Levene’s test for equality of variance. Table 5 presents the 
analysis statistics, including group means, standard deviation, mean differences, t-scores and 
significance values. Inspection of Table 5 indicates that hypothesis 1 (Leaders in non- 
prosecuted companies will exhibit higher levels of ethical values, moral philosophy, 
corporate social responsibility, and lower levels of psychopathic traits then leaders in 
organisations with prosecution records) was not supported by the t-test comparison. 
Significant differences were not detected between the mean scores for each group. Similarly, 
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hypothesis 2 where leaders in non-prosecuted organisations are expected to show higher 
levels of transformational or/and transactional leadership styles than prosecuted 
organisational leaders were also not confirmed due to insignificant p values for both 
leadership styles in Table 6. A counterintuitive result was then yielded by the passive-
avoidant leadership score comparison, where the level of passive-avoidant tendencies were 
significantly higher in the non-prosecuted organisation leaders at the p < .05 level. This 
subsequently disproves hypothesis 3, and suggests that in actuality it is rather the leaders in 
the non-prosecuted organisations who possessed higher levels of Passive-Avoidant (aversion 














Table 6. T-test Analysis: Comparison of MLQ Leadership Style Scale Mean Scores Between Groups   
 Non-Prosecuted Prosecuted  
 Mean Mean   
  SD SD T-Score (df) 
Sig (2-
tailed) 
Transformational Leadership 3.11 3.14 -.17 (16) 0.87 
 0.27 0.41   
Transactional Leadership 2.54 2.3 .88 (16) 0.39 
 0.66 0.53   
Passive-Avoidant Leadership 1.39 0.73 2.78 (16) 0.01 
  0.6 0.41   
All Equal Variances Assumed     
Table 5. T-Test Analysis: Comparison of Attribute-Based Scale Mean Scores 
Between Groups 
    
 Non-Prosecuted Prosecuted  
 Mean Mean   
  SD SD T-Score (df) 
Sig (2-
tailed) 
Ethical Leadership Scale 6.2 6.25 -.24 (16) 0.81 
 0.49 0.4   
Ethics Position Questionnaire 6.03 5.56 1.03(16) 0.32 
 0.6 1.15   
Corporate Social Responsibility Image Scale 6.23 6.4 -.65(16) 0.53 
 0.69 0.46   
Psychopathy Self-Report Scale 2.24 2.04 .6(16) 0.56 
  0.54 0.8   
All Equal Variances Assumed 
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The remaining three leadership outcome sub-factor scales of extra effort, leader 
effectiveness, and satisfaction (Table 7 below) also shows non-significant results, indicating that 
levels of successful leadership outcomes also do not differ significantly between the two 
populations.  
 
Table 7. T-test Analysis results of MLQ Leader Outcome 
Scores  
  
  Means SD Mean Difference T Score (df) Sig (2-tailed) 
Extra Effort      
Non-Prosecuted 2.79 0.5 -0.24 -.86 (16) 0.4 
Prosecuted 3.03 0.67       
Leader Effectiveness      
Non-Prosecuted 3.13 0.3 -0.05 -.21 (16) 0.84 
Prosecuted 3.18 0.62       
Satisfaction      
Non-Prosecuted 3 0.76 -0.3 -.89 (16) 0.39 
Prosecuted 3.3 0.67       







The current study investigated differences in the levels of leader value-based attributes 
and leadership styles between organisations with and without safety related prosecutions. 
Leaders from companies with and without records of safety-related prosecutions were 
examined for evidences of their ethical, moral, social, and psychopathic values, as well as the 
particular transformational, transactional, and passive-avoidant leadership styles that these 
leaders tend to exhibit towards their employees. While the data does provide some evidence 
of meaningful differences in one specific leadership style, the results were largely 
insignificant or counterintuitive of the original research hypotheses. Regarding the person-
based leader attributes of ethical values, moral philosophy, social responsibility and 
psychopathy levels, no significant differences in these attribute levels were found between 
the prosecuted and non-prosecuted group leaders. This suggests that, using the present data 
set, leaders in prosecuted and non-prosecuted companies do not necessarily differ in their 
ethical, moral, social and psychopathic tendencies when directing their organization’s 
operations. Similarly, leaders in the two study groups also did not differ significantly in their 
transformational and transactional leadership styles, thus showing that CEOs/directors in both 
groups most likely exhibits the same amount or level of transformational and transactional 
leadership thoughts and behaviours. What is of notable difference is the level of passive-
avoidant leadership found in the present data set, whereby the non-prosecuted leaders in 
actuality reported having significantly higher tendencies in engaging in this style of 
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leadership than those from the prosecuted organisations. 
This leads to a conclusion that Hypothesis 1 where leaders in organisations with no 
prosecution records will exhibit higher levels of a.) ethical values, b.) moral philosophy, c.) 
corporate social responsibility, and lower levels of d.) psychopathic personality traits when 
compared to leaders in organisations with prosecution records has not been supported. Albeit 
the two organisation achieving slight differences in the group average scores for these 
attributes, no significance was detected to indicate meaningful distinctions between the 
attribute levels yielded from leaders in these two groups. Likewise for Hypothesis 2, leaders 
in non-prosecuted organisations also did not demonstrate significantly higher levels of 
transformational or both transformational and transactional leadership styles. Postulations in 
Hypothesis 3 was then disproven by the results yielded in the t-test analysis, whereby the 
non-prosecuted organizational leaders had demonstrated a significantly higher level of 
passive-avoidant leadership style rather than those from the prosecuted group. This 
unexpected result suggested that it is the leaders from organisations without major safety-
related incidents records that are in fact exhibiting more laissez faire and passive 
management by exception (MBEP) specific leadership tendencies in their leadership attitudes 
and behaviours. This entails these leaders reporting more self-perception of being 
responsibility-averse, delaying decision making, managing organizational obligations and 




Despite the initial hypothesis not being supported by the results obtained, the data has 
yielded some interestingly unexpected trends that still warrants discussion. The findings are 
intriguing in that they reveal trends opposite to common predictions of leadership styles on 
safety-related outcomes as presented by Clarke (2013), as well as the notable distinction in 
safety-strategy related decision making styles between the prosecuted and non-prosecuted 
groups. Firstly, Clarke’s examination of the dynamic between leadership styles and safety 
outcomes concluded that transformational and transactional leadership styles were both 
distinctive antecedents to safety leadership and safety outcomes. Transformational and 
active-transactional leadership-oriented perceptions and behaviours, such as sustained 
monitoring and intervention of safety issues at work, active and physical demonstrations of 
safety practices, and incorporating safety-orientated priorities into organisational policies 
were major factors to fostering successful safety climate. Through this practical influence, 
increased levels of employee participation and compliance to safety regulations in the 
workplace should become evident. Clarke’s meta-analysis of various studies on safety 
leadership and their outcomes has identified numerous empirical data in support of this 
phenomenon. The leadership style results yielded by the current analysis however have been 
largely counterintuitive to these studies. Much of this may be attributed to the low response 
rate producing inconclusive analysis outcomes, however some alternative explanations may 
be still offered. At the introduction of this study, it was predicted that leaders from 
organisations without major reported incidents would demonstrate a higher level of 
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transformational and transactional qualities, as this was expected serve as the foundation for 
the companies’ positive safety records. On the opposite end of this assumption, organisations 
with notable records of safety related prosecutions were expected to reveal leaders with 
distinguishably higher levels of passive-avoidant leadership styles, as the lack of attention to 
safety standards at work would naturally appear as a result of the tendency to neglect and 
avoid one’s leadership duties. The reality that non-prosecuted leaders had in actuality 
reported significantly higher tendencies for passive-avoidant leadership behaviour in the 
current study then hints at the possibility of other factor(s) unaccounted for at the start of the 
study that may be influencing this result.  
The above possibility then directs attention to the second finding of interest. In response 
to the Health and Safety strategy development style questionnaire in the research survey, 50% 
of non-prosecuted leaders elected an independent decision making style after obtaining 
advice or consultation while 50% made important safety decisions through group-based 
consensus. On the other hand, 100% of leaders in prosecuted organisations have indicated 
group-based consensus as their dominant method of decision making. Thus in interpreting 
this particular distinction between the two study groups, a speculation emerges in that safety 
incidents from prosecuted organisations and the passive-avoidant leadership tendencies 
reported by the non-prosecuted group could partly be a result of this contrast in corporate 
decision making styles. In particular, logistical issues of group and time coordination, as well 
as the individual and interpersonal dynamic that accompanies each of these strategy-forming 
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methods may be major factors in influencing the above outcomes.  
 
Decision-Making Styles 
Under the consensus-based decision making structure, the leader works in a group to 
discuss safety related issues and agendas with other top level executives and directors. A 
decision is then only made after agreement is achieved with all members across the board. 
Conversely, leaders who adopt the individual decision making style may consult and elicit 
suggestions from others to obtain the information they need, but ultimately hold the power to 
make the final call on safety matters. Thus while 50% of the safety decision making styles 
adopted by non-prosecuted leaders still involves seeking input from others, the main 
distinction lies in that these leaders do not need to wait for a consensus to be reached. An 
examination of leadership styles by Faraci, Lock, and Wheeler (2013) especially highlights 
this time-based factor as a major disadvantage in consultative and consensus leadership 
styles. Efficiency in finalizing and implementing strategic decisions is crucial to preventing 
safety incidents from occurring, and it may be that the group consensus system in prosecuted 
organisations are causing its leaders to wait around too long for agreement to resolve safety 
issues in time. Compared to individual decision-making styles, group based consensus 
systems are more prone to disruptions in communication due to the increased number of 
people required in the process, which then again may lead to issues of timeliness and delay in 
leader response and action behaviours (van Ginkel, Tindale, & van Knippenberg, 2009; 
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Jackson, Hutchinson, Peters, Luck, & Saltman, 2013). Group dynamic issues such as 
“analysis paralysis” may also be one example of a disruption to making timely safety-related 
decisions, whereby discussions have come to a standstill due to conflicting opinions between 
group members and agreement is unable to be reached for safety decisions to be finalized 
(Snowden & Boone, 2007). Leaders from prosecuted organisations thus may be experiencing 
these scenarios more frequently due to a higher level of contrasting ideas and strategic views 
being presented during group discussions. Board participants may become caught on 
resolving differences of opinion and ultimately failing to reach agreement on safety matters 
in a timely manner. Conversely, individual leaders in non-prosecuted companies may be 
relatively free of this group-time constraint, thus enabling critical safety decisions to be made 
promptly in response to pressing organisational safety needs. 
The structure by which top level decision-making groups are formed may also exert 
some impact. Under corporate contexts, it is not uncommon for the top boards to be 
comprised of external directors and other industry shareholders alongside the organisation’s 
own executive leaders (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998). In such cases these 
leaders have their decision making powers partly or wholly governed by the external 
investors who often may not possess safety-specific knowledge regarding the industry’s 
operations (Bainbridge, 2002). It is also a common case for individual leaders, being the 
internal expert on the technical workings of their business, to be better equipped with 
knowledge of how the mechanisms of the industry runs, as well as possessing more decision-
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making powers than those controlled by external boards (Nanda, Silveri, & Han, 2013). This 
suggests that non-prosecuted leaders could be making more quality safety decisions than 
prosecuted organisations, where it is possible that group decisions often involve participation 
from external directors who are not as familiar with the operations of the company, and 
therefore cannot provide constructive advice on safety issues. Individual leaders who rely less 
on the governance of outside boards may also tend to introduce more diversity into their 
decisions, as well as taking more necessary (often profit-related) risks or investments to 
improve the safety standards in the company (Deutsch, 2005; Nanda et al., 2013). 
Furthermore, history analysis studies by Dowell, Shackell, and Stuart (2011) also reveals that 
smaller, more independent board directors and CEO’s tends to demonstrate more versatility 
and swiftness in response when firms are facing critical business periods. This independence 
in executive control may be another possible factor that is facilitating rapid decision-making 
powers to non-prosecution leaders when urgent safety strategies are required.    
This influence of decision group-structure could also be applied to explain the lack of 
differentiation in levels of value-based attributes between leaders in the two study groups. It 
may be plausible that leaders do not differ inherently in their level of ethical, moral, social 
and psychopathic characteristics under neutral conditions not requiring value-based 
judgements (such as the time they responded to the research survey), but deviates from this 
when they are under actual influence from the organisational structure in which they work 
around. In particular, Dalton et al. (1998) notes that the size of the firms, in addition to the 
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composition of the top decision-making body, notably has a significant impact on the 
discretional powers a CEO holds. This restriction in freedom of action then proceeds to affect 
the degree to which leaders may control company activities, access resources, and implement 
organisational strategies. Under this premise, it is then also possible for a leader’s ethical, 
moral, social and personality based attributes to be influenced or controlled by the level of 
authority they hold. Demands and expectations from higher-governing directors or investors 
may place pressure on CEOs who rely on group decisions to make ethically or morally 
compromised decisions regarding safety issues, particularly when financial and other profit-
related implications against shareholder interests are involved (Deutsch, 2005). 
Furthermore, other interpersonal considerations in group dynamics are also interpreted 
in light of the prosecuted organisation’s decision-making styles. In particular, Brahm and 
Kleiner (1996) lists social, ego, and risk-averse behaviours as common concerns for 
individuals taking part in group decision procedures. Social conformity first of all may be a 
likely obstacle in conveying opinions during board meetings, as it often of human nature for 
individuals to adhere to the voice of the large majority. Under organisational contexts, a CEO 
facing a board of external officials may feel compelled to adopt the preferences and interests 
of relevant firm investors and directors while inevitably compromising other objectives in the 
process (Dalton et al., 1998). Applying this to the current situation, leaders from prosecuted 
organisations may be finding themselves conceding to pressure from higher authority to 
prioritize performance or financial agendas over safety matters. A case of herd mentality 
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could also be a product of group conformity, whereby leaders tend to accept the majority 
consensus without further probing or exploration of alternatives (Bainbridge, 2002). It is 
possible that this may then in turn lead to either a failure to adequately address safety 
problems at work, or, if safety is not mentioned at all by the larger group, a complete lack of 
focus on safety-related issues altogether. Secondly, Brahm and Kleiner (1996) discusses the 
influence of the leader ego on group decision making. Leaders who are the head and 
representative of a decision panel may be concerned about how their opinions and decisions 
impact the rest of the organisation’s outlook, and therefore become reserved in their ideas or 
suggestions for improving safety measures. Similarly, executive leaders whose decision 
making powers are controlled by a higher external board may also be wary of how their 
actions are viewed and criticized by the rest of the board authorities. This then ties into the 
last influence of risk-averse behaviours, where leaders become unwilling to be exposed to 
accountability and offering ideas that may elicit conflict with others in the group (Staver, 
2013). These are all likely factors that are hindering prosecuted leaders from maintaining 
safety standards in their industries, and consequently increasing opportunities for safety 
incidents to occur. On the other hand non-prosecuted leaders who are less bound by such 
group influences in their decision making process may act more freely and adequately in 






The contrast between decision making styles and group versus individual dynamics may 
also provide some explanations for the significant passive-avoidant leadership tendencies 
reported in the non-prosecuted group leaders. The current study thus makes a theoretical 
interpretation that group-based leaders, such as those in prosecuted organisations, may tend to 
adopt a group mentality where leadership roles and responsibilities are concerned. That is, 
due to leaders in prosecuted organisations utilising more team-based approaches when 
formulating safety-related strategies, they may perceive any negative safety outcomes as 
being less the result of their own influence and more by the group itself overall. Being part of 
a larger decision-making body, leaders have more room to pass around the baton of 
responsibility and feel less accountable when things go awry. In situations where multiple 
individuals are relevant to the decision making process, it is also possible for leaders to be 
influenced by role ambiguity as they perceive themselves as less as the sole source of 
authority. The responsibility baton is then passed around the decision panel with no clear 
indication of who is required to make the final call. Prosecuted leaders may therefore feel 
more inclined to attribute organisational problems and lack of action-initiation as an outcome 
of the collective group they work in, and thus do not perceive themselves specifically as the 
reason for any passive-avoidant issues that have risen in the past. This role ambiguity may 
then lead to further uncertainty amongst other employees in the decision-making body, which 
has been empirically correlated with decreased perception in leader effectiveness, job 
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satisfaction and turnover rates (Cicero, Pierro, & Van Knippenberg, 2010). This phenomenon 
could then further instigate occurrences of safety related incidents in prosecuted 
organisations, whereby the uncertainty in top-level decision groups begins to cloud 
operational clarity down in the frontlines of the industry. Bainbridge (2002) also identifies 
social loafing as one of the downfalls of group decision making, as having the presence of 
other organisational members may cause leaders to take a back seat during critical 
discussions. This could also influence prosecuted leaders to feel less responsible for any 
negative outcomes associated with passive-avoidant leadership. Conversely non-prosecuted 
leaders who work more individually have no excuse for shedding decision-making 
responsibility onto others, and therefore may be more conscious of the link between their 
own behaviour and failures that arise from the company’s operations. This increased 
awareness may ultimately be another potent factor that contributes to the higher level of 
passive-avoidant tendencies reported by these leaders in the leadership style survey. 
An examination of Kelloway, Mullen, and Francis’ (2006) analysis of transformational 
and passive-avoidant leadership styles on safety outcomes also offers some further 
explanations. In highlighting the distinction between different leadership constructs, the 
authors emphasizes the fact that elements of positive (transformational and transactional) and 
negative (passive-avoidant) leadership styles may co-exist within individuals. A leader may 
thus demonstrate qualities of both transformational and passive-avoidant leadership, and may 
be identified as either one of the leader types depending on the frequency at which they 
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demonstrate each leadership style. It is thus possible for non-prosecuted leaders to exhibit 
both leadership styles in tandem with each other, but due to earlier discussions on individual 
leader dynamics, may subsequently perceive their passive-avoidant qualities as being more 
frequently accentuated than their transformational attributes. Based on this theory, Kelloway 
and colleagues continues to suggest that it is likely for leaders to demonstrate different 
leadership styles in differing work situations. Leaders may demonstrate transformational 
qualities in aspect of the organisation’s operations (eg. performance and finance related 
goals), while behaving passively or avoidant of duties in another (safety and employee 
wellbeing). This then becomes a plausible explanation as to why non-prosecuted 
organisations experiences less major safety-related incidents despite reporting higher levels 
of passive-avoidant leadership, as these leaders may in fact be demonstrating passive 
avoidant qualities in areas not related to safety, but because such other areas might occupy a 
larger portion of their organizational agendas compared to safety-related matters, it has 
caused these leaders to perceive themselves as more passive-avoidant than transformational 
leaders. Simultaneously, these leaders may have been demonstrating adequate 
transformational leadership in their performance of safety-related obligations, and thus 
contributed positively to maintaining workplace safety standards and ultimately reducing 





Research Strengths and Limitations 
An obvious setback within the current study was the lack of response data available to 
provide a more reliable and comprehensive analysis of the results. This limitation was not 
due to methodology design. A reasonable number of companies with prosecution records that 
fitted the research criteria for the current study were located. The sample issue perhaps has 
more to do with access to top-level organizational leaders (eg. names, head office location, 
contact information) were scarce and the study was forced to rely on addressing survey 
packages to general “CEO/Director” titles in some cases as the leader’s identity or name was 
not available in public records. Furthermore, study participation may have been hampered 
due to the sensitive nature of the study and the level of personal information the research 
survey was attempting to collect. Considerations of initiating contact with organization 
leaders to arrange research participation was also not feasible as direct contact may have 
negatively influenced response intentions further, and thus making sufficient empirical data 
difficult to obtain. The use of participation incentives to encourage response rates were 
considered but ultimately discarded. While other research involving general population 
samples may benefit from utilizing reward incentives such as vouchers and prize draws, using 
such approaches on a formal high-authority group such as organisational CEOs appeared less 
appropriate. Efforts to encourage responses that were acceptable within the scope of the 
current study were still made however, such as by dispatching follow up letters to the 
organistions surveyed to prompt for replies.   
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A second issue to note is the problem of social desirability in leader responses. It is 
highly likely that leaders from either study groups felt inclined to present both themselves 
and/or their organisation in a more positive light. This social desirability bias is inherent to all 
self-report survey studies however, and the current research did take measures to minimize 
the level of social desirability by limiting the emphasis the survey items had in relation to 
health and safety. Particular measures were also taken in an effort to control for other 
extraneous factors that may have affected the accuracy and relevance of leader responses. 
This included concerns that the participants who had responded to the surveys were 1.) not 
employed or involved with the organisation at the time incidents occurred, 2.) not occupying 
the relevant job position desired for the current study, and 3.) not directly involved with 
health and safety-related decisions or activities in the company. These were accounted for 
through obtaining and analyzing demographic information such as position title and job 
tenure, as well as utilizing Judge and Dobbin’s (1995) decision-making style questionnaire 
and the organisational activity time allocation form.  
Despite the study power issue however, notable advantages may be found with the 
current investigation. The main strength of this quasi-experimental field study lies in that this  
design may be the most suitable research design for determining the leadership antecedents of 
high-risk industry safety incidents. Given obvious ethical considerations, it would be entirely 
impossible to carry out a full experimental study whereby leaders are prompted to make 
value-based decisions under laboratory settings with the aim of seeing if such decisions 
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results in industrial incidents. Thus by utilising real safety prosecution data, the present 
methodology produced a study that most closely approximates a true experiment in capturing 
and explaining the influences of leadership attributes on organisational safety outcomes. The 
current study was also introduced during the timely rise of prominent organisational safety 
alerts in the New Zealand high-risk industry scene, which adds further relevance to the data 
obtained by facilitating understanding of the possible individual and group dynamics that 
underlies the occurrence of organisational safety failures.  
 
Implications for Further Research 
Given the prominence of leader decision-making styles in the results, future research 
may also attempt to identify possible influence of organisational decision-making styles on a 
leader’s value-based attributes, as well as how these elements interact to produce specific 
safety outcomes. Furthermore, studies may attempt to reveal the exact practical examples of 
how this interaction affects the decisions being made. For instance, a CEO may compromise 
their ethical and moral considerations for employee wellbeing by suppressing safety-related 
discussions due to the pressure of facing a higher decision board. A leader acting under a 
consensus group may feel less compelled to reject a safety-related decision derived from a 
majority vote, even if such a decision was less than ideal. By revealing the exact effects the 
leader experiences from such processes, methods of intervention or improvement could be 
suggested to facilitate better judgement and action under these circumstances. A further 
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correlational component may then be added to test for relationships between leader attributes 
and safety outcome variables (eg. employee perceptions, types of policies formed around 
safety issues, organisation incident rates, etc). Capturing employee reports of leader 
behaviours in a 360 degree style multi-rater study may also provide a more comprehensive 
and accurate view of true leader attributes. Due to the nature of corporate businesses 
involving numerous complexities in their operation and structure, studies should also 
endeavour to account for other organisational factors in their examination of leader attributes. 
These may include the financial and performance status of organisations, the structural make-
up of decision-making bodies, the type of industry studied, and the specific operational norms 
and characteristics unique to those industries. Lastly, studies may also investigate the possible 
effects the newly reformed Health and Safety at Work Act may have on leader safety 
perceptions in the workplace. The present study may be replicated with specific organisations 
after the law change to determine potential differences in leader attitudes and behaviour 
towards organistional safety issues, and compare these along with post-law change incident 
rates against figures reported beforehand.  
 
Conclusion 
The initial assumptions of this study was built on the premise that organistional safety 
outcomes are partly a product of top-leader value-based attributes and leadership styles. 
However the results in the present study have suggested, decision-making styles and other 
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structural and interpersonal dynamics may also have a significant part to play. It is evident 
that leader attributes and operating styles do not act in isolation in affecting decisions related 
to safety outcomes. Rather, they act as one of the many components in a larger and more 
complex interaction of social and organisational processes. Results from the current study 
have then signaled a need for further investigation into the exact practical factors within this 
interaction that compromises leader values and impedes ideal decision-making on safety 
matters. Ultimately, it remains indisputable that an organisational leader wields considerable 
powers of influence over an industry’s operations, along with the immense responsibility of 
demonstrating decisions and behaviours that holds significant implications for corporate 
safety outcomes. As seen from the Pike River incident, a lack of awareness and action from 
top executives towards safety management in the operating field can result in catastrophic 
losses of worker lives and organisational credibility. The emphasis that the antecedents for 
positive safety outcomes originates from the top thus cannot not be understated. Finally, 
regardless of whether such responsibility lies with a single individual or a larger governing 
body, organisations have the irrevocable duty of not only ensuring adequate safety measures 
are being implemented, but also that the top leaders running its operation are also ethically, 
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* Due to copyright requests from the scale providers, a 5-item sample of the MLQ is 
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We would like to invite you to participate in a research project on leadership in New Zealand 
industries. The aim of this project is to examine leadership styles in different types of 
organisations in New Zealand. 
 
You are invited to complete the enclosed survey that includes an assessment of your 
perceptions on leadership styles and attributes, which should take about 10 to 15 minutes to 
complete. The completed survey can be returned using the postage-paid return envelope 
provided. The survey is entirely anonymous, and all responses will be kept strictly 
confidential. Neither participants nor organisations are identifiable, and thus the complete 
privacy of respondents is guaranteed.  
 
As the survey is returned anonymously, any data provided are not be able to be withdrawn 
from the study once submitted. By completing the survey it will be understood that you have 
consented to participate in the project, and that you consent to publication of the results of the 
project with the understanding that anonymity will be preserved. 
 
The project is being carried out for the purposes of a Masters degree in Industrial and 
Organisational Psychology at the University of Canterbury by Trisha Chueh under the 
supervision of Associate Professor Christopher Burt. We can be contacted at 
trisha.chueh@pg.canterbury.ac.nz and christopher.burt@canterbury.ac.nz respectively to 
discuss any concerns you may have about participation in the project.  
 
This study has been reviewed and approved by the Department of Psychology, University of 
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7th October 2014 
 




In September you should have received an invitation to participate in my New Zealand 
Industrial Leadership Research project. I would like to thank you if you took the time to 
complete the survey. If you would still like to participate it is not too late, and surveys can be 
returned up until October 31st.    
 
If you no longer have access to the original paper copy of the survey that was sent with the 











Masters candidate  
University of Canterbury 
